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I  am  glad  to  meet  with  this  distinguished  group  of 
business  and  financial  journalists  in  a  leisurely  set- 
ting.  As  a  policymaker,  I  feel  I  have  much  in 
common  with  the  members  of  your  profession.  Both 
you  and  I  must  be  alert  to  every  twist  and  nuance 
of  the  changing  economic  scene.  Both  you  and  I 
must  keep  busy  searching  the  business  skies  for  some 
clues  to  the  economic  future.  I find  this  aspect  of  my 
work  exciting  and  intriguing,  as  I  am  sure  you  do. 
But  it  does  involve  a  certain  risk  for  both  of  us. 
Sharing-as  we  do-the  problem  of  continually 
meeting  deadlines,  we  are  in  danger  of  becoming  so 
preoccupied  with  the  very  short  run  that  we  fail  to 
see  economic  events  in  perspective.  For  that  very 
reason,  I  have  wanted  to  take  advantage  of  your  in- 
vitation,  so that  we  might  ponder  together  the  histori- 
cal  developments  which  have  brought  our  economy 
to  its  present  condition.  This  is  a  large  and  highly 
important  subject.  I  cannot  hope  to  do  full  justice 
to  it  on  the  present  occasion.  Nevertheless,  I  shall 
make  a  start  this  evening. 
As  you  are  well  aware,  these  past  few  years  have 
been  trying  times  for  the  American  people.  Not  only 
have  we  lived  through  the  agony  of  Vietnam  and 
Watergate,  but  some  of  us  have  even  begun  to 
wonder  whether  our  dream  of  full  employment,  a 
stable  price  level,  and  a  rising  standard  of  living  for 
all  our  people  is  beyond  fulfillment. 
Early  last  year,  economic  expansion  began  to  falter 
in  our  country,  as  it  did  in other  countries  around  the 
world.  At  the  same  time,  the  pace  of  the  inflation 
that  had  been  building  for  more  than  a  decade  ac- 
celerated  sharply  further.  As  the  year  advanced,  it 
became  increasingly  clear  that  our  economy  was 
moving  into  a  recession. 
During  the  past  two  quarters,  the  real  gross  na- 
tional  product  has  declined  by  5  per  cent,  and  the 
level  of industrial  production  is now  12 or  13 per  cent 
below  last  September.  The  unemployment  rate  has 
risen  swiftly,  and  so  also  has  the  idle  capacity  in  our 
major  industries.  The  decline  in  business  activity 
since  last  fall  has  been  the  steepest  of  the  post-war 
period,  and  yet  the  advance  of  the  price  level-while 
considerably  slower  than  last  year-is  continuing:  at  a 
disconcerting  pace. 
No  business-cycle  movement  can  be  comprehended 
solely  in  terms  of  the  events  that  occur  within  that 
cycle  or  the  one  preceding  it.  The  economic  currents 
of  today  are  heavily  influenced  by  longer-range  de- 
velopments-such  as  changes  in  economic  and  finan- 
cial  institutions,  the  course  of  public  policy,  and  the 
attitudes  and  work  habits  of  people.  By  examining 
the  historical  background  of  recent  economic  troubles, 
we  should  be able  to  arrive  at  a  better  understanding 
of  where  we  now  are. 
The  current  recession  is best  viewed,  and  I  believe 
it will be so regarded  by  historians,  as the  culminating 
phase  of  a  long  economic  cycle. 
There  have  been  numerous  long  cycles  in  the  past 
-that  is, units  of  experience  combining  two  or  more 
ordinary  business  cycles.  One  such  long  cycle  ran  its 
course  from  1908 to  1921, another  from  1921 to  1933. 
And  if we  go  back  to  the  nineteenth  century,  we  en- 
counter  long  cycles  from  1879  to  1894  and  from 
1894  to  1908.  These  long  cycles  differ  in  innumer- 
able  ways  from  one  another.  But  they  also  have  some 
features  in  common-in  particular,  each  culminates 
in  an  economic  decline  of  more  than  average  inten- 
sity. 
The  beginning  of  the  long  cycle  that  now  appears 
to  be  approaching  its  natural  end  may  be  dated  as 
early  as  1958,  but  it  is  perhaps  best  to  date  its  start 
in  1961.  The  upward  movement  of  economic  activity 
which  began  in  that  year  was  checked  briefly  in  1967 
and  interrupted  more  significantly  in  1970.  Although 
these  interruptions  were  watched  with  concern  and 
some  anxiety  by  practicing  economists  and  other  in- 
terested  citizens,  they  will  be  passed  over  lightly  by 
economic  historians  concerned  with  large  events. 
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monthly  and  quarterly  data,  and  looking  only  at  an- 
nual  figures,  we  find  that  total  employment  rose 
every  year  from  1961  through  1973.  So  also  did 
disposable  personal  income  and  personal  consumption 
expenditures-both  viewed  on  a per  capita  basis,  and 
in  real  terms.  This  sustained  upward  trend  of  the 
economy  came  to  an  end  in  1974. 
The  successive  phases  of  the  long  upswing  from 
1961  to  1974  provide  a  useful  perspective  on  our 
current  problems.  Some  years  ago,  in  my  work  at 
the  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research,  I  ob- 
served  a  pattern  in  past  long  upswings-an  initial 
stage  that  may  be  called  the  “industrial  phase”  fol- 
lowed  by  what  is  best  described  as  the  “speculative 
phase.”  The  imbalances  that  develop  in  this  latter 
phase  lead  inevitably  to  the  final  downturn.  The 
events  of  the  past  15 years  conform  rather  closely  to 
this  pattern. 
The  period  from  1961  through  1964  may  be  re- 
garded  as  the  industrial  phase  of  the  long  upswing. 
Productivity  grew  rapidly-increasing  in  the  private 
nonfarm  sector  at  an  annual  rate  of  3.6  per  cent  be- 
tween  the  final  quarters  of  1960  and  1964,  or  well 
above  the  average  rate  of the  preceding  decade.  Unit 
labor  costs  were  then  remarkably  stable,  and  so  too 
was  the  general  price  level.  Real  wages  and  profits 
rose  strongly.  During  this  period  of  sustained  eco- 
nomic  expansion,  unemployment  fell  from  about  7 
per  cent  of  the  labor  force  to  5  per  cent,  while  the 
rate  of  use  of  industrial  capacity  rose  substantially. 
The  second-or  speculative-phase  of  the  long 
upswing  began  around  1965  and  continued  through 
much  of  1974.  This  ten-year  period  was  marked  by a 
succession  of  major,  interrelated,  and  partly  over- 
lapping  speculative  waves  that  in  varying  degrees 
gripped  other  leading  industrial  countries  as  well  as 
the  United  States. 
The  first  speculative  movement  involved  corporate 
mergers  and  acquisitions.  In  the  euphoria  of  what 
some  commentators  have  called  the  “go-go”  years, 
rapid  growth  of  earnings  per  share  of  common  stock 
became  the  overriding  goal  of  many  business  man- 
agers.  Other  yardsticks  of  corporate  performance- 
such  as  the  rate  of  return  on  new  investments-were 
neglected,  and  so  too  were  the  serious  risks  of  in- 
creased  leveraging  of  common  stock. 
The  aggregate  volume  of  large  corporate  acquisi- 
tions,  which  for  some  years  had  been  running  at 
about  $2  billion  per  year,  jumped  to  $3  billion  in 
1965,  to  $8  billion  in  1967,  to  $12½  billion  in  1968, 
and  then  tapered  off.  This  was  the  great  era  of 
conglomerates,  when  a variety  of unrelated  businesses 
were  brought  together  under  a  single  corporate  man- 
agement.  Entrepreneurs  who  displayed  special  skill 
in such  maneuvers  were  hailed  as financial  geniuses- 
until  their  newly  built  empires  began  to  crumble. 
Being  preoccupied  with  corporate  acquisitions  and 
their  conglomerate  image,  many  businessmen  lost 
sight  of  the  traditional  business  objective  of  seeking 
larger  profits  through  better  technology,  aggressive 
marketing,  and  improved  management.  The  produc- 
tivity  of  their  businesses  suffered,  and  so  too  did 
the  nation’s  productivity. 
The  spectacular  merger  movement  of  the  late 
1960’s was  reinforced,  and  to a  degree  made  possible, 
by  the  speculative  movement  that  developed  in  the 
market  for  common  stocks.  The  volume  of trading  on 
the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  doubled  between 
1966 and  1971,  and  for  a time  trading  volume  on  the 
American  Exchange  rose  even  faster.  The  prices  of 
many  stocks  shot  up  with  little  regard  to  actual  or 
potential  earnings.  During  the  two  years  1967  and 
1968,  the  average  price  of  a  share  of  common  stock 
listed  on  the  New  York  Exchange  rose  40  per  cent, 
while  earnings  per  share  of  the  listed  companies  rose 
less  than  2  per  cent.  On  the  American  Exchange, 
the  average  price  per  share  rose  during  the  same 
years  more  than  140  per  cent  on  an  earnings  base 
that  again  was  virtually  unchanged. 
Much  of this  speculative  ardor  came  from  a  section 
of  the  mutual  fund  industry.  For  the  new  breed  of 
“performance  funds,”  long-term  investment  in  the 
shares  of established  companies  with  proven  earnings 
became  an  outmoded  concept.  In  their  quest  for 
quick  capital  gains,  these  institutions  displayed  a 
penchant  for  risky  investments  and  aggressive  trad- 
ing.  In  1965,  a  typical  mutual  fund  turned  over 
about  one-fifth  of  its  common  stock  portfolio;  by 
1969,  that  fraction  had  risen  to  nearly  one-half.  As 
Wall  Street  then  had  it,  the  “smart  money”  went 
into  issues  of  technologically-oriented  firms  or  into 
corporate  conglomerates-no  matter  how  well  or 
poorly  they  met  the  test  of  profitability. 
Speculation  in equities  was  cooled  for  a time  by  the 
stock  market  decline  of  1969-1970,  but  then  it  re- 
sumed  again  and  took  on  new  forms.  Money  man- 
agers  began  to  channel  a  preponderant  part  of  their 
funds  into  the  stocks  of large  and  well-known  firms- 
apparently  with  the  thought  that  earnings  of  those 
companies  were  impervious  to  the  vicissitudes  of 
economic  life.  A  huge  disparity  was  thereby  created 
between  the  price-earnings  ratios  of  the  “favored 
fifty”  and  those  of  other  corporations.  Share  prices 
of  these  “favored”  companies  were,  of  course,  especi- 
ally  hard  hit  in  the  subsequent  shakeout  of  the  stock 
market. 
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the  United  States.  From  the  late  1960’s  until  about 
1973,  nearly  every  major  stock  exchange  in  the 
world  experienced  a  large  run-up  in  share  prices, 
only  to  be  followed  by  a  drastic  decline.  Indeed, 
speculation  reached  a  more  feverish  pace  in  some 
countries  than  in  the  United  States.  On  the  Tokyo 
stock  exchange,  for  example,  both  share  prices  and 
the  trading  volume  actually  doubled  in  the  twelve 
months  between  January  1972  and  January  1973, 
and  then  suffered  a  sharp  reversal. 
The  third  speculative  wave  that  nourished  the  long 
upswing  of  our  national  economy  occurred  in  the 
real  estate  market.  Homebuilding  fluctuated  around 
a  horizontal  trend  during  the  1960’s.  The  vacancy 
rate  in  rental  housing  was  at  a  high  level  from  1960 
to  1965,  then  fell  steadily  until  the  end  of the  decade, 
and  thus  helped  pave  the  way  for  a  new  housing 
boom.  Between  January  of  1970  and  January  of 
1973,  the  volume  of  new  housing  starts  doubled. 
Since  then,  homebuilding  has  plunged,  and  in  some 
sections  of  the  nation  it  has  virtually  come  to  a  halt. 
Failures  of  construction  firms  and  unemployment 
among  construction  workers  have  reached  depression 
levels.  These  unhappy  developments  stem  in  large 
measure  from  the  excesses  of  the  housing  boom  that 
got  under  way  in  1970. 
Inflationary  expectations  clearly  played  a  substan- 
tial  role  in bolstering  the  demand  for  houses.  But  the 
boom  was  fostered  also  by  an  array  of  governmental 
policies  designed  to  stimulate  activity  in  the  housing 
sector.  These  governmental  measures,  however  well- 
intentioned,  gave  little  heed  to  basic  supply  condi- 
tions  in  the  industry  or  to  the  underlying  demand 
for  housing. 
In  response  to  easy  credit  and  Federal  subsidies, 
merchant  builders  moved  ahead  energetically,  put  up 
one-family  homes  well  ahead  of  demand,  and  thus 
permitted  the  inventory  of  unsold  homes  to  double 
between  1970  and  1973.  Speculative  activity  was 
even  more  intense  in  the  multi-family  sector-that  is, 
in  apartments  built  for  renting,  and  particularly  in 
condominiums  and  cooperatives,  which  accounted  for 
a fourth  of  the  completions  of multi-family  structures 
by  the  first  half  of  1974. 
The  boom  in  housing  was  financed  by  a  huge  ex- 
pansion  of  mortgage  credit  and  construction  loans. 
Real  estate  investment  trusts  played  an  exceptionally 
large  role  in  supplying  high-risk  construction  loans 
for  condominiums,  recreational  developments,  and 
other  speculative  activities.  The  growth  of  real 
estate  trusts  was  extraordinary  by  any  yardstick. 
Their  assets,  amounting  to  less  than  $700  million  in 
1968,  soared  to  upwards  of  $20  billion  by  1973.  Un- 
sound  practices  accompanied  this  rapid  growth  and, 
as  a  result,  many  real  estate  trusts  now  face  difficult 
financial  problems. 
The  speculative  boom  in  real  estate  was  not  con- 
fined  to  residential  structures.  It  extended  to  specu- 
lation  in  land,  to  widespread  building  of  shopping 
centers,  and  to  construction  of  office  buildings.  By 
1972,  the  vacancy  rate  in  office  buildings  reached 
13  per  cent,  but  this  type  of  construction  still  kept 
climbing. 
The  real  estate  boom  in  the  United  States  during 
the  early  1970’s  had  its  parallel  in  other  countries. 
Speculation  in  land  and  properties  became  rampant 
in  the  United  Kingdom.  In  1972  alone,  new  house 
prices  rose  47  per  cent  on  the  average.  The  amount 
of  credit  absorbed  in  real  estate  ventures  rose  so 
rapidly  that  the  Bank  of  England  felt  forced  to  place 
special  controls  on  bank  lending  for  such  purposes. 
And  in Germany,  the  boom  in residential  construction 
during  1971-73  left  an  inventory  of  about  a  quarter 
million  unsold  units-more  than  a  third  of  a  peak 
year's  output-that  now  overhang  the  market. 
It  is  in  the  nature  of  speculative  movements  to 
spread  from  one  country  or  market  to  another.  Just 
as  the  speculative  wave  in  real  estate  was  beginning 
to  taper  off  in  1973,  a  new  wave  of  speculation  got 
under  way-this  time  in  inventories.  That  was  the 
fourth  and  final  speculative  episode  of  the  long  eco- 
nomic  upswing  from  1961  to  1974.  It  involved  mas- 
sive  stocking  up  of  raw  materials,  machinery,  parts, 
and  other  supplies  in  the  United  States  and  in  other 
industrial  countries. 
The  inventory  speculation  of  1973  and  1974  was 
the  outgrowth  of  a boom  in business  activity  that  had 
raised  its  head  by  1972  in  virtually  every  industrial 
country  of  the  world.  The  synchronism  of  economic 
expansion  in  these  countries  was  partly  coincidental, 
but  the  expansion  that  stemmed  from  ordinary  busi- 
ness-cycle  developments  was  reinforced  by  the  adop- 
tion  of  stimulative  economic  policies  almost  every- 
where.  As  a  result,  production  increased  rapidly 
around  the  world,  and  led  to  a  burgeoning  demand 
for  raw  materials,  machine  tools,  component  parts, 
and  capital  equipment-goods  for  which  our  country 
is  a  major  source  of  supply.  The  pressure  of  rising 
world  demand  was  reinforced  in  our  markets  by  the 
devaluation  of  the  dollar,  which  greatly  improved 
our  competitive  position  in  international  trade. 
By  the  beginning  of  1973,  as  business  firms  at- 
tempted  to  meet  intense  demands  from  both  domestic 
and  foreign  customers,  serious  bottlenecks  and  short- 
ages  had  begun  to  develop  in  numerous  industries- 
especially  those  producing  steel,  non-ferrous  metals, 
paper,  chemicals,  and  other  raw  materials.  In  this 
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trial  commodities  quickened  both  here  and  abroad. 
The  dramatic  advance  of  food  prices  in  1973,  and 
later  in energy  prices,  greatly  compounded  the  world- 
wide  inflationary  problem.  In  our  country,  these 
price  pressures  were  suppressed  for  a  time  by  price 
and  wage  controls,  but  the  general  price  level  ex- 
ploded  when  controls  were  phased  out  in  late  1973 
and  early  1974. 
One  of  the  unfortunate  consequences  of  inflation 
is  that  it  masks  underlying  economic  realities.  As 
early  as  the  spring  of  1973,  a  perceptible  weakening 
could  be  detected  in  the  trend  of consumer  buying  in 
this  country.  The  business  community,  however, 
paid  little  attention  to  this  ominous  development. 
The  escalating  pace  of  inflation  fostered  expectations 
of  still  higher  prices  and  persistent  shortages  in  the 
years  ahead,  so  that  intensive  stockpiling  of  com- 
modities  continued.  Inventories  increased  out  of  all 
proportion  to  actual  or  prospective  sales.  In  fact, 
the  ratio  of inventories  to  sales,  expressed  in physical 
terms,  had  risen  by  the  summer  of  1974 to  the  highest 
figure  for  any  business-cycle  expansion  since  1957- 
another  year  when  a  severe  recession  got  under  way. 
In  summary,  the  period  from  1965  to  1974  was 
marked  by  a  succession  of  interrelated,  partly  over- 
lapping,  speculative  waves-first,  in  buying  up  of 
existing  businesses  ; then,  in  the  stock  market,  next, 
in markets  for  real  estate;  and  finally,  in  markets  for 
industrial  materials  and  other  commodities. 
A  prolonged  speculative  boom  of  this  kind  can 
seldom  be  traced  to  a  single  causal  factor.  In  this 
instance,  however,  a  dominant  source  of  the  problem 
appears  to  have  been  the  lack  of  discipline  in  gov- 
ernmental  finances. 
The  industrial  phase  of the  long  upswing  drew  to  a 
close  in late  1964 or  early  1965.  By  then,  the  level  of 
real  output  was  very  close  to  the  limits  imposed  by 
our  nation’s  physical  capacity  to  produce.  By  then, 
the  level  of  wholesale  prices  was  already  moving  out 
of  its  groove  of  stability.  Nevertheless,  our  Govern- 
ment  did  nothing  to  moderate  the  pace  of  expansion 
of  aggregate  monetary  demand.  On  the  contrary,  it 
actually  embarked  on  a  much  more  expansive  fiscal 
policy.  The  tax  reductions  of  1964  were  followed 
in  1965  by  fresh  tax  reductions  and  by  a  huge  wave 
of  spending  both  for  new  social  programs  and  for 
the  war  in  Vietnam.  These  misadventures  of  fiscal 
policy  doomed  the  economy  to  serious  trouble,  but 
we  were  slow  to  recognize  this.  Indeed,  substantial 
tax  reductions  occurred  again  in  1969 and  1971,  and 
they  too  were  followed  by  massive  increases  of  ex- 
penditures. 
Deficits  therefore  mounted,  and  they  persisted  year 
in  and  year  out.  Over  the  last  ten  complete  fiscal 
years-that  is,  from  1965 through  1974-the  Federal 
debt  held  by  the  public,  including  obligations  of 
Federal  credit  agencies,  rose  by  more  than 50  per 
cent.  The  large  and  persistent  deficits  added  little  to 
our  nation’s  capacity  to  produce,  but  they  added 
substantially  to  aggregate  monetary  demand  for 
goods  and  services.  They  were  thus  directly  respon- 
sible  for  much  of  the  accelerating  inflation  of  the 
past  decade. 
Monetary  and  credit  policies  were  not  without 
some  fault.  As  every  student  of  economics  knows, 
inflation  cannot  continue  indefinitely  without  an  ac- 
commodating  increase  in  supplies  of  money  and 
credit.  It  is  very  difficult,  however,  for  a  central 
bank  to  maintain  good  control  of  money  and  credit 
when  heavy  governmental  borrowing  drives  up  in- 
terest  rates,  and  when  the  public  is unwilling  to  face 
squarely  the  long-run  dangers  inherent  in  excessively 
stimulative  economic  policies. 
To  make  matters  worse,  laxity  in  our  national  eco- 
nomic  policies  spilled  over  into  private  markets.  The 
“new  economics,”  of  which  less  is  now  heard  than 
before,  held  out  the  possibility,  if  not  the  actual 
promise,  of  perpetual  prosperity.  Many  businessmen 
and  financiers  came  to  view  the  business  cycle  as 
dead,  and  to  expect  the  Federal  Government  to  bail 
out  almost  any  enterprise  that  ran  into  financial 
trouble.  All  too  frequently,  therefore,  the  canons  of 
financial  prudence  that  had  been  developed  through 
hard  experience  were  set  aside. 
Many  of  our  business  corporations  courted  trouble 
by  permitting  sharp  reductions  in  their  equity  cush- 
ions  or  their  liquidity.  In  the  manufacturing  sector, 
the  ratio  of  debt  to  equity-which  had  been  stable  in 
the  previous  decade-began  rising  in  1964 and  nearly 
doubled  by  the  end  of  1974.  Moreover,  a  large  part 
of  the  indebtedness  piled  up by  business  firms  was  in 
the  form  of  short-term  obligations,  and  these  in  turn 
grew  much  more  rapidly  than  holdings  of  current 
assets. 
Similar  trends  developed  in  some  segments  of 
commercial  banking.  Large  money-market  banks 
came  to  rely  more  heavily  on  volatile  short-term 
funds  to  finance  their  business  customers,  and  at 
times  they  increased  their  loan  commitments  to  busi- 
nesses  beyond  prudent  limits.  A  few  bank  managers, 
too,  began  to  concern  themselves  excessively  with 
maximizing  short-run  profits,  so  that  the  prices 
quoted  for  their  common  stock  would  move  higher. 
Capital  ratios  of  many  banks  deteriorated  ; question- 
able  loans  were  extended  at  home  and  abroad  ;  in- 
sufficient  attention  was  given  here  and  there  to  the 
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too  much  bank  credit  went  into  the  financing  of 
speculative  real  estate  ventures. 
A  variety  of  loose  practices  also  crept  into  State 
and  local  government  finance.  Faced  with  rapidly 
expanding  demands  for  services  and  limited  sources 
of  revenue,  some  governmental  units  resorted  to 
extensive  short-term  borrowing  and  employed  dubi- 
ous  accounting  devices  to  conceal  their  budget  defi- 
cits.  Statutory  debt  limits  were  circumvented  through 
the  creation  of  special  public  authorities  to  finance 
the  construction  of  housing,  schools,  and  health  fa- 
cilities.  Some  of  these  authorities  issued  so-called 
“moral  obligation”  bonds,  which  investors  in  many 
instances  regarded  as  the  equivalent  of  “full  faith 
and  credit”  obligations.  The  novel  financial  devices 
seemed  innocuous  at  the  time,  but  they  have  recently 
become  a  source  of  serious  concern  to  investors  in 
municipal  securities. 
A  nation  cannot  realistically  expect  prosperous 
economic  conditions  to  continue  very  long  when  the 
Federal  Government  fails  to  heed  the  warning  signs 
of  accelerating  inflation,  when  many  of  its  business 
leaders  spend  their  finest  hours  arranging  financial 
maneuvers,  and  when  aggressive  trade  unions  push 
up  wage  rates  far  beyond  productivity  gains.  After 
1965,  the  strength  of  the  American  economy  was 
gradually  sapped  by  these  ominous  trends.  Produc- 
tivity  in the  private  nonfarm  sector,  which  had  grown 
at  an  annual  rate  of  3.6  per  cent  from  1961  through 
1964,  slowed  to  a  2.2  per  cent  rate  of  advance  from 
1964 to  1969,  then  to  1.5 per  cent  from  1969  to  1974. 
Expansion  in  the  physical  volume  of  national  output 
likewise  declined  during  successive  quinquennia.  The 
rate  of  inflation,  meanwhile,  kept  accelerating. 
With  the  pace  of  inflation  quickening,  seeds  of 
the  current  recession  were  thus  sown  across  the 
economy.  Rising  prices  eroded  the  purchasing  power 
of  workers’  incomes  and  savings.  Corporate  profits 
diminished-a  fact  that  businessmen  were  slow  to 
recognize  because  of  faulty  accounting  techniques. 
New  dwellings  were  built  on  a  scale  that  greatly 
exceeded  the  underlying  demand.  Inventories  of 
commodities  piled  up,  often  at  a  fantastic  pace,  as 
businessmen  reacted  to  gathering  fears  of  shortages. 
Credit  demands,  both  public  and  private,  soared  and 
interest  rates  rose  to  unprecedented  heights. 
These  basic  maladjustments  are  now  being  worked 
out  of  the  economic  system  by  recession-a  process 
that  entails  enormous  human  and  financial  costs. 
Our  country  has  gone  a  considerable  distance  in 
developing  policies  to  alleviate  economic  hardships, 
and  these  policies  have  been  strengthened  recently. 
Nevertheless,  the  recession  has  wrought  great  dam- 
age  to  the  lives  and  fortunes  of  many  of  our  people. 
This  recession  has  cut  deeply  into  economic  activi- 
ties.  It  must  not,  however,  be viewed  as being  merely 
a  pathological  phenomenon.  Since  we  permitted 
inflation  to  get  out  of  control,  the  recession  is  now 
performing  a  painful-but  also  an  unavoidable- 
function. 
First,  it is correcting  the  imbalances  that  developed 
between  the  production  and  sales  of  many  items, 
also  between  orders  and  inventories,  between  capital 
investment  and  consumer  spending,  and  between  the 
trend  of  costs  and  prices. 
Second,  business  managers  are  responding  to  the 
recession  by  moving  energetically  to  improve  effi- 
ciency-by  concentrating  production  in  more  modern 
and  efficient  installations,  by  eliminating  wasteful 
expenditures,  by  stimulating  employees  to  work  more 
diligently,  and  by  working  harder  themselves. 
Third,  the  recession  is  improving  the  condition  of 
financial  markets.  Interest  rates  have  moved  to 
lower  levels  as  a  result  of  declining  credit  demands 
and  of  the  Federal  Reserve’s  efforts  to  bolster  the 
growth  of money  and  credit.  Commercial  banks  have 
taken  advantage  of  the  reduced  demand  for  loans  to 
repay  their  borrowings  from  Federal  Reserve  Banks, 
to  reduce  reliance  on  volatile  sources  of  funds,  and  to 
rebuild  liquid  assets.  The  rapidly  rising  inflow  of 
deposits  to  thrift  institutions  has  likewise  permitted  a 
reduction  of  indebtedness  and  addition  to  their  liquid 
assets. 
Fourth,  the  recession  is  wringing  inflation  out  of 
the  economic  system.  Wholesale  prices  of  late  have 
moved  down,  and  the  rise  of consumer  prices  has  also 
slowed.  Although  general  price  stability  is  not  yet 
in  sight,  a  welcome  element  of  price  competition  has 
at  long  last  been  restored  to  our  markets. 
These  and  related  business  developments  are  pav- 
ing  the  way  for  recovery  in  economic  activity.  No 
one  can  foresee  with  confidence  when  the  recovery 
will  begin.  The  history  of  our  country  indicates 
clearly,  however,  that  the  culminating  downward 
phase  of a long  cycle  need  not  be  of  protracted  dura- 
tion. 
Signs  are  multiplying,  in  fact,  that  an  upturn  in 
economic  activity  may  not  be far  away.  For  example, 
employment  rose  in April  after  six  successive  months 
of  decline.  The  length  of  the  workweek  also  stabi- 
lized  last  month.  The  rate  of layoffs  in manufacturing 
is  now  turning  down,  and  some  firms  have  been 
recalling  workers  who  formerly  lost  their  jobs.  Sales 
of  goods  at  retail-apart  from  autos-have  risen 
further.  Business  and  consumer  confidence  has  been 
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economic  activity  have  been  strengthened  by  passage 
of  the  Tax  Reduction  Act  of  1975. 
Our  nation  stands  at  present  at  a  crossroads  in  its 
history.  With  the  long  and  costly  cycle  in  business 
activity  apparently  approaching  its  end,  the  critical 
task  now  is  to  build  a  solid  foundation  for  our 
nation’s  economic  future.  We  will  accomplish  that 
only  if  we  understand  and  benefit  from  the  lessons 
of  recent  experience. 
Since  World  War  II,  a consensus  has  been  build- 
ing  in  this  country  that  the  primary  task  of  economic 
policy  is  to  maintain  full  employment  and  promote 
maximum  economic  growth.  We  have  pursued  these 
goals  by  being  ever  ready  to  stimulate  the  economy 
through  increased  Federal  spending,  lower  taxes,  or 
monetary  ease.  Neglect  of  inflation,  and  of  longer- 
run  economic  and  financial  problems,  has  thus  crept 
insidiously  into  public  policy  making.  Our  Govern- 
ment  has  become  accustomed  to  respond  with  alacrity 
to  any  hint  of  weakness  in  economic  activity,  but  to 
react  sluggishly,  and  sometimes  not  at  all,  to  signs 
of  excess  demand  and  developing  inflationary  pres- 
sures. 
The  thinking  of many  of our  prominent  economists 
has  encouraged  this  bias  in  our  economic  policies. 
During  the  1950’s  and  1960’s,  they  frequently  argued 
that  “creeping  inflation”  was  a  small  price  to  pay 
for  full  employment.  Some  even  suggested  that  a 
little  inflation  was  a good  thing-that  it  energized  the 
economic  system  and  thus  promoted  rapid  economic 
growth. 
This  is a  dangerous  doctrine.  While  inflation  may 
begin  slowly  in  an  economy  operating  at  high  pres- 
sure,  it  inevitably  gathers  momentum.  A  state  of 
euphoria  then  tends  to  develop,  economic  decision- 
making  becomes  distorted,  managerial  and  financial 
practices  deteriorate,  speculation  becomes  rampant, 
industrial  and  financial  imbalances  pile  up,  and  the 
strength  of the  national  economy  is slowly  but  surely 
sapped.  That  is  the  harsh  truth  that  the  history  of 
business  cycles  teaches. 
To  emphasize  this  truth,  I  should  now  like  to  offer 
this  distinguished  group  of  journalists  a  bit  of  pro- 
fessional  advice.  Since  few  of  you  are  reluctant  to 
pass  along  hints  as to  how  I  should  do  my  job,  I  have 
decided  to  suggest  to  you  what  the  really  big  eco- 
nomic  news  story  of  1975  is likely  to  be. 
The  story  has  to  do  with  the  drama  now  unfolding 
on  Capitol  Hill  in  the  implementation  of  the  Budget 
Control  Act  adopted  last  year.  If  I  am  right  in 
thinking  that  our  present  economic  difficulties  are 
largely  traceable  to  the  chronic  bias  of  the  Federal 
budget  toward  deficits,  there  can  be  no  doubt  about 
the  importance  of  what  is  now  being  attempted.  No 
major  democracy  that  I know  of has  had  a more  defi- 
cient  legislative  budget  process  than  the  United  States 
-with  revenue  decisions  separated  from  spending 
decisions  and  the  latter  handled  in  piecemeal  fashion. 
Budgets  in  this  country  have  just  happened.  They 
certainly  have  not  been  planned. 
We  are  now  attempting  to  change  that  by adopting 
integrated  Congressional  decisions  on  revenues  and 
expenditures.  My  advice  to  you  journalists  is  to 
follow  this  new  effort  closely.  It  has  a  significance 
for  our  nation  that  may  carry  far  into  the  future. 
But  nothing  can  be taken  for  granted  here.  We  have 
tried  budgetary  reform  once  before  under  the  Legis- 
lative  Reorganization  Act  of  1946,  and  it  failed.  It 
failed  partly  because  of  the  challenge  to  cherished 
Committee  prerogatives,  partly  also  because  Congress 
as a whole  balked  at accepting  so much  self-discipline. 
I  would  urge  you  to  study  the  history  of  that  earlier 
effort  and  to  watch  the  present  undertaking  for  tell- 
tale  signs  of  similar  faltering. 
The  potential  gain  for  our  nation  from  budget 
reform  is  enormous  even  in  this  first  year  of  “dry 
run.”  If,  in  fact,  the  work  of  the  new  budget  com- 
mittees  produces  in  the  Congress  a  deeper  under- 
standing  of  the  impossibility  of  safely  undertaking 
all  the  ventures  being  urged  by  individual  legislators, 
a constructive  beginning  toward  a healthier  economic 
environment  will  have  been  made.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  the  new  budget  procedures  are  scuttled,  or 
if  they  are  used  with  little  regard  to  curbing  the  bias 
toward  large-sized  Federal  deficits,  there  ultimately 
may  be  little  anyone  can  do  to  prevent  galloping  in- 
flation  and  social  upheaval. 
I  am  inclined  to  be  optimistic  about  the  outcome. 
More  and  more  of our  people  are  becoming  concerned 
about  the  longer-range  consequences  of  Federal  fi- 
nancial  policies.  Perspective  on  our  nation’s  eco- 
nomic  problems  is  gradually  being  gained  by  our 
citizens  and  their  Congressional  representatives.  A 
healthy  impatience  with  inflation  is  growing.  You 
journalists  are  becoming  more  actively  involved  in 
the  educational  process.  I  therefore  remain  hopeful 
that  we  shall  practice  greater  foresight  in  dealing 
with  our  nation’s  economic  problems  than  we  have 
in  the  recent  past,  and  that  we  will  thus  build  a 
better  future  for  ourselves  and  our  children  in  the 
process. 
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